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OVERVIEW: THE FEDERAL COURT
SYSTEM-1886, 1986, AND 2086
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT*
In a symposium entitled "The Federal Courts: The Next
100 Years," it may seem very odd that I am going to talk to you
about the federal courts, among other things, in 1886. This may
seem to be a new proof of what Fred Rodell wrote many years
ago in his book, Woe Unto You, Lawyers!: "The Law is the killy-
loo bird of the sciences." 1 The killy-loo bird, you may recall, is
the bird that flies backwards because it does not care where it is
going, but is mightily interested in where it has been. There is
some truth, I think, in that analogy as a description of our pro-
fession. We are a conservative profession. We do look at what we
have done in the past. We depend very mightily on precedent.
My real reason for looking backward, however, is that I think by
looking back a hundred years and seeing the differences between
the federal courts in 1886 and 1986, we have at least some glim-
mer of the kind of dramatic change that our grandchildren and
great-grandchildren will experience.
Before I talk about the federal courts in 1886, I want to go
back even further. If Professor Howard can quote to us a tal-
ented English writer talking about an English eccentric, perhaps
it is permissible for me to do the same thing. In 1889 Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge gave a talk to a group of law students on the
changes that he had seen in his forty-two years at the bar. He
entitled it, "The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889." During that
discourse, he described an interesting figure in English law, one
whom I am afraid is unknown to today's generation of lawyers
and law students. When I was a law student, we heard about
Baron Parke. It was a name to scare young law students because
he was associated with the notorious Hilary Rules, the rules of
* William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, University of Texas.
A.B., 1947, Wesleyan University; LL.B., 1949, Yale University. This is a slightly edited
and footnoted version of extemporaneous remarks made by Professor Wright at the
Symposium.
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special pleading. Today, no one knows anything about pleading,
much less about historical figures involved in pleading.2 In any
event, Coleridge had known Parke, and I have always greatly en-
joyed what Lord Chief Justice Coleridge had to say about Baron
Parke. Baron Parke was, of course, one of the judges of the
Court of Exchequer. Coleridge said:
The ruling power in the Courts in 1847 was Baron Parke, a
man of great and wide legal learning, an admirable scholar, a
kind-hearted and amiable man, and of remarkable force of
mind. These great qualities he devoted to heightening all the
absurdities, and contracting to the very utmost the narrowness,
of the system of special pleading. The client was unthought
of. . . . "I have aided in building up sixteen volumes of
Meeson & Wellsby," said he proudly to Charles Austin, "and
that is a great thing for any man to say." "I dare say it is," said
Austin; "but in the Palace of Truth, Baron, do you think it
would have made the slightest difference to mankind, or even
to England, if all the cases in all the volumes of Meeson &
Wellsby had been decided the other way?" He repeated his
boast to Sir William Erle. "It's a lucky thing," said Sir Wil-
liam, as he told me himself, "that there was not a seventeenth
volume, for if there had been the Common Law itself would
have disappeared altogether, amidst the jeers and hisses of
mankind;" "and," he added, "Parke didn't seem to like it."
Peace be with him. He was a great lawyer, a man of high
character and powerful intellect. No smaller man could have
produced such results. If he ever were to revisit the glimpses of
the moon one shudders to think of his disquiet. No absque hoc,
no et non, no colour, express or implied, given to trespass, no
new assignment, belief in the great doctrine of the negative
pregnant no longer necessary to legal salvation, and the very
nice question, as Baron Parke is reported to have thought,
whether you could reply de injuria to a plea of deviation in an
action on a marine policy not only still unsolved, but actually
considered not worth solution!
3
2. I may have been too pessimistic. In an opinion that came down a few months
before this Symposium, which I did not see until afterward, Judge Richard Arnold said,
"To read this complaint as not alleging the presence of the res within the district would
exalt technicality to a level seldom attained since the days of Baron Parke." United
States v. Beechcraft Queen Airplane Serial No. LD-24, 789 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1986).
3. Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, 57 CONTEMP. REV. 797, 799-801
(1890).
[Vol. 38
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss3/4
FEDERAL COURTS OVERVIEW
That much change in a very conservative nineteenth century.
What has happened in the last one hundred years, between
1886 and 1986? Consider what the federal courts were like in
1886." First, that great court upon which Jay Wilkinson, Clem-
ent Haynsworth, and Donald Russell sit did not exist. There
were no courts of appeals. They did not come until 1891 with
the Evarts Act.5 Instead, there were two courts of original juris-
diction, the circuit courts and the district courts, and the Su-
preme Court sitting in review of them. Supreme Court Justices
still rode circuit. They did not do it often, but the statute still
required them to sit with the circuit court once every two years
in each district within their circuit. There were no three-judge
courts. That was a device that was not invented until the twenti-
eth century. There were no United States magistrates. There
were (and some may think it a great blessing) no law clerks.
There was no Judicial Code. At that time in order to find out
how the federal courts were governed, one had to hunt out scat-
tered provisions in the revised statutes of 1875, many of them
still unchanged from that great statute whose 197th birthday we
will celebrate next Wednesday, the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The kinds of litigation that the courts heard in 1886 were
far different from what we have today. There was no FELA, no
securities laws, no antitrust laws, no consumer protection laws,
no black lung cases, no products liability cases. The categories of
federal crime were very narrow. There was no Mann Act, no
Controlled Substances Act, no RICO. There were, in theory, civil
rights cases, but very few of them in actuality. The statute that
is now title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code6 was
passed in 1871, but in the first sixty-five years of its existence
there are only nineteen reported decisions in which the statute
was involved. In 1961, the year the Supreme Court gave new life
to section 1983 by reconstruing it in Monroe v. Pape, the total
number of civil rights cases that were filed was only 296. This
4. The best way to follow the changes in the federal courts, and to see what they
were like at any given point in the past, is in the classic study of the history of the
federal judiciary, somewhat misleadingly titled, F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE Busi-
NESS OF THE SuPREME COURT (1928). See also Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal
Judicial System, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948).
5. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified at scattered titles of U.S.C.).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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figure does not contemplate habeas corpus or collateral attacks
on criminal convictions, but simply straight-out civil rights
cases. That was one-half of one percent of all the civil cases in
the federal courts. In 1985 there were nearly 40,000 civil rights
cases filed, more than one-seventh of all civil cases.
The rules on jurisdiction were different. The amount in con-
troversy then was $500. It applied both to diversity and to fed-
eral question cases. Currently, the diversity jurisdictional
amount is $10,000, but nothing in federal question cases. The
rule then may have been far ahead of its time. In 1886 the de-
fendant could remove a case on the basis of a federal defense. In
1969 an American Law Institute study recommended that the
statutes be changed to restore that right,8 but nothing has hap-
pened. A unanimous Supreme Court decision three years ago
noted with great approval the ALI proposal,9 but Congress has
done nothing.
Venue was different; there was none. One could sue a de-
fendant in any district in which he could be served with process.
The first venue statute was not enacted until 1887.
Pleading did not resemble at all what we have today. At
that time, and indeed until 1938, the federal courts still main-
tained the separation of law and equity although they were ad-
ministered by the same court. On the law side, there was a Con-
formity Act. 10 The federal court was required to conform to
whatever the rules of procedure were in the state in which it was
sitting. Therefore, in South Carolina, in the federal district
court, you would have had code pleading because South Carolina
had adopted the Field Code in 1870. At that time, however, in
roughly half the states, the federal courts would still have had to
apply the rules of common-law pleading, the rules that Baron
Parke had developed.
We are accustomed today to great breadth of joinder of par-
ties and claims. That was quite unknown to our forefathers in
1886. All kinds of joinder were very narrow. There was such a
thing as a class action, but hardly anybody ever really saw one.
8. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1312(a), at 25, 188-200 (1969).
9. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 n.9
(1983).
10. Practice Conformity Act, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
[Vol. 38
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Indeed, long before the present rule 23 was adopted in 1966, a
very great scholar, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., said about the original
rule 23 as it was adopted in 1938: "This tribute to the memory
of Wesley Hohfeld would be more suitable in a law review article
than in an enactment which is to guide the actions of practical
men day in and day out." He added, "The situation is so tan-
gled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the
world would be any the worse off if the class-suit device had
been left buried in the learned obscurity of Calvert on Parties to
Suits in Equity. ' 12 1 hate to think what Professor Chafee would
have thought of today's class actions in which all matter of
claims that simply would not have been cognizable before 1966
are being litigated. Many people in this room will remember my
late colleague and dear friend, Bernie Ward. He often spoke at
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conferences. I can remember Bernie re-
marking many times on how wrong it was that on June 30, 1966,
there was no possibility that the Hilton Hotels could be sued
because they overcharge each patron a dollar for telephones, and
on July 1, 1966, there suddenly is a procedural device that lets
them be sued. Consequently, out of self-defense, the hotels have
to settle for many millions of dollars. All of this, said Bernie,
accomplished under a statute that allows one to make rules of
procedure that are not to abridge, alter, or enlarge substantive
rights. We did this and we have lived with it for 20 years.
Other procedural devices that are commonplace to us were
unknown in 1886. There was effectively no discovery, no pretrial
conference, no summary judgment, and no declaratory judg-
ment. Relations between the state and federal courts were far
different then than they are now. In 1886 Swift v. Tyson 
3 still
reigned so the federal courts were free to adopt their own no-
tions of common law in diversity litigation unless a state statute
or constitutional provision was on point. At that time, one could
not have sued in federal court to challenge the constitutionality
of a state statute. The eleventh amendment was still thought to
bar suits against states, and the fiction of Ex parte Young, 4 by
11. Z. CHFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 246 (1950).
12. Id. at 200.
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (overruled in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)).
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
1987]
5
Wright: Overview: The Federal Court System -- 1886, 1986, and 2086
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which we now allow that kind of challenge, did not come until
1908. Because there were no suits challenging state legislation,
there was no need for such things as abstention, which was not
invented until 1941,15 or of the doctrine of "Our Federalism,"
which was not invented until 1971.16
Appellate review was considerably different. The Supreme
Court had appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts in civil
cases when the amount in controversy exceeded $2000. If your
case was less than $2000, there was no appeal at all. If you were
a criminal defendant and were convicted, there was no appeal at
all. The only time the Supreme Court could hear criminal cases
in 1886 was if the judges of the circuit court were divided on a
question of law. Appeal from a final judgment of conviction first
came in a limited way in an act in 1889. Review by the Supreme
Court, when it existed, was of right. The notion that the Su-
preme Court should control its own docket and have discretion
about which cases it would hear, and the use of certiorari to im-
plement that control, came with the Judges' Bill of 1925.'7 There
was no review at all of interlocutory orders, no matter how im-
portant. Even though a temporary injunction was granted, or the
temporary injunction was denied and the defendant was going to
come over tomorrow and cut down your ornamental shade trees,
there was no way you could go to any appellate court for review.
The year 1891 marked the first tentative step into the waters of
interlocutory review.
When you finally got a judgment, its effect was very differ-
ent than it is now. Indeed, the changes in this regard are so dra-
matic that we have a new terminology. It would be as unfashion-
able today for anyone to utter the words res judicata as it would
be to drive a car with fins. Instead, we have to talk about claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. The content of the rules has
changed, as well. Most dramatically, we no longer require mutu-
ality; we allow nonmutual preclusion. Perhaps most important,
the attitude toward preclusion is dramatically different today
from what it was in an earlier time. I had the very great fortune
the year after I graduated from law school to clerk for Judge
15. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
16. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
17. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
47-48 (1982); 48 U.S.C. § 864 (1982); and at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 38
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Charles E. Clark of the Second Circuit, former Dean of the Yale
Law School and a giant in the field of procedure. In an opinion a
few years before I clerked for him, he said, "The defense of res
judicata is universally respected, but actually not very well
liked."' 8 That was the attitude at that time. Only when they
were actually forced to it would courts say, "No, you have had
your day in court." Today, with the pressures that we have on
dockets, we have seen remarkable new enthusiasm about preclu-
sion. Today's attitude was well captured by Justice Rehnquist in
an opinion for the Court in 1981. The Ninth Circuit had held
that under the circumstances of a particular case, simple justice
would not allow one plaintiff to be barred while two similarly
situated plaintiffs got the wind.'9 Justice Rehnquist and the
Court not only reversed, but they indicated that they did not
like the Ninth Circuit's attitude. What he said was the following:
[W]e do not see the grave injustice which would be done by the
application of accepted principles of res judicata. "Simple jus-
tice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a
period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res
judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual
judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular
case.
20
If you add up all the changes between 1886 and 1986 that I
have described, it is quite obvious that the work of the federal
courts today and how they perform that work bears hardly any
resemblance to what it was a hundred years ago; and it seems to
me that a hundred years from now, it will surely be as different
from today as today is from one hundred years in the past. Pro-
fessor Howard spoke of our litigious society and of the forces
that are leading to an increase in litigation.21 The extent of this
increase is hard to predict. There is a familiar paragraph of John
Barton, Professor of Law at Stanford. In 1976 he wrote:
The United States is presently experiencing a legal explosion.
As implausible as it may appear, exponential extrapolation of
increases over the last decade suggests that by the early 21st
18. Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. See Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981).
21. See Howard, supra pp. 368-72.
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century the federal appellate courts alone will decide approxi-
mately 1 million cases each year. That bench would include
over 5,000 active judges, and the Federal Reporter would ex-
pand by more than 1,000 volumes each year.
22
There has been a lot of controversy about that prediction, and I
am glad to say that I do not think that horrifying prediction is
about to come true. In fact, it seems to me we really do not
know much in terms of predicting future trends in volume of
litigation.
At least I do know where we have come in the ten years
since Professor Barton wrote. In fiscal year 1984, the courts of
appeals terminated 31,000 cases.23 I really doubt if it is going to
jump from 31,000 to 1,000,000 between now and the end of the
century. There are now 186 authorized judgeships, rather than
the 5000 that Professor Barton feared. I have not counted the
volumes of Federal Reporter that come to my office each year,
but I am sure it is not yet one thousand per year. I do not know
what the volume is going to be, but it seems obvious to everyone
that the amount of litigation is on the increase, it is on the in-
crease more rapidly in federal courts than in state courts, and
that this is going to require new ways of looking at the role of
courts and how courts should go about doing their work.
One rather small point was called to my attention by the
Director of Research at the Federal Judicial Center, William B.
Eldridge. It seems to be a very telling point on why we never
catch up with the caseload. He pointed-out to me that on June
30, 1978, there were seventeen vacancies among the district
courts and courts of appeals. That was just before the legislation
in October of that year that added a great many new judgeships.
The Center recommended that change because it was agreed
that we did not have enough judges to handle all the work. Con-
gress finally said, "Yes, you are right, we need more judges."
Congress authorized those in October 1978, but no matter which
administration it is, it is a time-consuming process to fill all the
new judgeships authorized by Congress. By June 30, 1979, ten
months after the Judgeship Bill had passed, there were 157 va-
cancies on the courts. There continued to be a substantial num-
22. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975).
23. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 106, table 2 [hereinafter ADMIN. OFF. REP. preceded by year].
[Vol. 38
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ber of vacancies, and it was not until 1984, six years after the
Judgeship Bill and only a couple of months before the next
Judgeship Bill, that the number of vacancies fell below twenty,
where it had been back in 1978.24 Mr. Eldridge notes:
It is a system fraught with outrageous overloads on judges, ac-
companied by desperate efforts to stay abreast, followed by a
large infusion of new judges who must be assimilated into the
judicial community. The potential problems of assimilating 117
new trial judges and 35 appellate judges are actually never re-
alized because the pace of filling appointments spreads the en-
tries out. But remember, we were in serious trouble before
these new positions were created, so we avoid assimilation
problems only by perpetuating the overload problem. This is
not a one-time, or even unusual, occurrence. It is the system we
use for staffng the federal bench.
25
Another point can be gleaned from looking at these num-
bers. In 1978, just before the bill increasing the number of
judges was passed, the number of cases commenced in the dis-
trict courts was 348 per judgeship. This was thought to justify a
twenty-five percent increase in the number of judges. Because
the judgeships were not actually filled, the caseload for each ac-
tual judgeship did not drop. If, however, you measure in terms
of authorized judgeships in 1979, there were only 300 cases filed
per authorized judgeship rather than the 348. By 1981 the num-
ber of cases per authorized judgeship was up to 350, more than
it had been in 1978. By 1984, when we got the next Judgeship
Bill, the caseload was 508. The same number of judges in 1984
that we had in 1979 terminated 100,000 more cases.26 This sta-
tistic suggests that either the judges are all working much
harder, that they all have become much more efficient, or that
they are not giving the attention to each case that they gave
when there was less pressure on the docket.
One other statistic deserves attention, and this will be the
last. Ten years ago, thirty-eight percent of all civil cases were
terminated without any court action because of a voluntary dis-
missal by the parties, presumably settlement. Last year, it was
forty-eight percent. It has gone up from thirty-eight percent to
24. Id. at 4, table 3.
25. Letter from William B. Eldridge to Charles Alan Wright (June 30, 1986).
26. 1984 ADMIN. OFF. REP. at 4, table 4.
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forty-eight percent in the course of a decade.27 Perhaps this
means that there are more frivolous cases being filed today and,
therefore, people realize the frivolity of their own litigation and
withdraw. On the other hand, it may mean that we now have
sufficient delays in the system and other factors connected with
the number of cases that we have that there is more pressure on
parties to settle rather than to wait and see what kind of a dis-
position they can get from the court.28
I do not know what the future is going to bring. If I had
spoken to you in 1886 when there were nine circuit judges and
eighty-three district judges, I could not have foreseen a system
with 186 circuit judges and 575 district judges. I think an in-
creased number of judges is going to be a part of the answer. I
do not see how that can be avoided. The proportion of cases re-
ceiving attention by a judge may shrink. I think that there is a
great likelihood of a larger role for magistrates and similar per-
sonnel. There is likely to be increased use of alternative dispute
resolution devices as institutional filters so that parties will not
get to a judge until they have tried arbitration or whatever alter-
native dispute device turns out to be popular. I wish I could
think that there was a possibility that one of Professor Howard's
suggestions would come to pass and that Congress would pass
clearer laws; however, I am afraid I have no hope whatsoever for
such a solution. Rather, I would think that we are going to do
away with the tradition of appeal as a right. We surely are going
to do that, although we are too late in doing it in terms of the
Supreme Court. The Court ought to have a wholly discretionary
docket. It would not surprise me at all if the courts of appeals
were to be hearing cases on a discretionary basis rather than an
appeal of right. I think we will almost surely have a fourth tier
of federal courts, although I do not know what form it will take.
Strange and wonderful things are going to happen to the
27. 1985 ADMN. OFF. REP. at 158, table 29.
28. This figure is less significant than I had thought at the time of this Symposium.
The Administrative Office includes within the category of "no court action" cases in
which a default judgment is entered by the clerk of court pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(1). The increase in cases terminated with no court action is attributable to a single
category of civil cases-actions by the United States to recover on defaulted student
loans and overpayment of veterans' educational benefits. See Letter from David L. Cook,
Chief Statistical Analysis and Reports Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, to Charles Alan Wright (Oct. 8, 1986).
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federal courts in the years to come as we strive to meet the chal-
lenges that the future is going to bring. It seems to me that the
University of South Carolina School of Law has made a fine con-
tribution to the Bicentennial Celebration by bringing together
the very talented people who are on either side of me to explore
ways by which the federal courts may meet the challenges of the
future.
11
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